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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----0000000----
HENRY MAAS, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
KENNETH J . ALLRED and 
ARVEL ALLRED , 
Defendants, 
and 
UTAH BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
----0000000----
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
----0000000----
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 14808 
This is an action by Plaintiff-Respondent against 
Defendant-Appellant, Utah Bank & Trust Company and others 
seeking a money judgment for the wrongful repossession and 
commercially unreasonable sale of a 1972 Mack tractor. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
~ 
I 
This case was submitted to the jury on special inter-
rogatories. Based on the jury's answers, the court entered 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against Utah Bank and 
Trust in the sum of $14, 839. 31 plus interest. A Judgment of No 
Cause of Action was entered in favor of the individual defendar.ts ·. 
Kenneth J. Allred and Arvel Allred. A Notice of Appeal was file: j 
I 
by plaintiff against the two individual defendants, but this cas: I 
has subsequently been settled as to them and that portion of the ~ 
appeal has been dismissed. The plaintiff-respondent has reserve:, 
its rights against the defendant-appellant, Utah Bank & Trust 
Company. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the Judgment of the 
trial court against appellant Utah Bank & Trust. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 11, 19 71, Kenneth Allred signed' 1 
note and entered into an Installment Sale and Security Agreement 
"B k11 I with appellant Utah Bank & Trust Company (hereinafter an · 
[Ex 3-P] The collateral for that Agreement was a 1972 Mack 
Tractor, Serial No. RL765LST9476 (hereinafter "1972 Mack"). 
[Ex 3-P] 
Approximately one year later, Kenneth Allred and 
1 • f "M ") entered into an respondent Henry Maas ,hereina ter aas 
-2-
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agreement by which Maas was to lease the 1972 Mack for a thirty-
two month period, and then, at the end of that time, the lease 
money would be used as payment on the 1972 Mack. [Ex 1-P, Tr 7] 
An additional balance of $6,000.00 was to be paid Kenneth Allred 
by Maas. [Ex 1-P] Maas was to make the payments directly to the 
Bank, which payments were to be in the exact amount of Allred's 
monthly payments on the Installment Sale and Security Agreement. 
[Tr 6-7, 11] In August, 1974, and in conjunction with other 
arrangements between the parties, the remaining balance to be 
paid Kenneth Allred by Maas was reduced from $6,000.00 to 
$3,500.00 by mutual agreement. Kenneth Allred specifically 
agreed that when the smaller amount was paid, Maas would receive 
full ownership and title to the 1972 Mack. [Ex 2-P, Tr 21-23] 
Kenneth Allred informed the Bank that Maas had posses-
sion of the 1972 Mack. [Tr 87] In January, 1973, Maas began 
making the monthly payments to the Bank [Tr 87] , and eventually 
made a total of twenty-six such payments. [Tr 10, 90] Those 
payments were always late but always accepted by the Bank. [Tr 73, 
82, 91-92, 97] At no time did the Bank ever tell Maas that it 
would not accept future late payments. [Tr 93] The total amount 
of the payments made by Maas was $18,720.00. [Tr 10-11, Ex 6-P] 
The account balance on the contract was reduced from $23,072.36 
at the time that Maas began making the payments to $4,346.38 by 
February 1, 1975. [Ex 6-P, Tr 89] 
-3-
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By early February 1975, Maas was behind in making two 
monthly payments. [Ex 6-P, Tr 29] He contacted a Bank loan 
officer, Gary Kotter, and agreed to make up the past due pay-
ments on February 21, 1975, and then to make another payment on 
March 1, 1975. Kotter, in those conversations, gave Maas no 
indication that the Bank would repossess the 1972 Mack without 
notice to him. [Tr 33] In conversations during the month of 
February, 1975, Kotter only indicated the matter would have to 
be resolved before the end of February, 1975. [Tr 95] 
On February 14, 19 7 5, Kenneth Allred took the 1972 
Mack while it was parked on the lot of F-B Truck Lines Company 
in Salt Lake City [Tr 39, 41, 123] while Maas was inside the F-Bj 
Terminal. [Tr 39, 12 3] Maas did not authorize this taking and 
received no prior notice of it. [Tr 42] 
Not knowing what had happened to the 1972 Mack, Maas 
called Kotter to see if the Bank had repossessed it. [Tr. 93] 
Kotter replied in the negative. [Tr 9 3] On February 18, 1975, 
Maas personally came in to see Kotter about the tractor. [Tr H 
Kotter told him that the delinquent payments would have to be 
made before the end of February, 1975. [Tr 95] 
Subsequently, Maas discovered that Kenneth Allred haci 
the 1972 Mack. [Tr 41] Thereupon, Maas and Kenneth Allred 
25 1975' which in some entered into an agreement on February , 
particulars amended the November 21, 1972 agreement. [Ex 4-Pl 
-4-
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under the terms of the agreement of February 25, 1975, Kenneth 
Allred was to return the 1972 Mack to Maas [Tr 46, 124], and 
Maas agreed to give Kenneth Allred the right to repossess if all 
future payments were not made by the first day of any succeeding 
month. [Ex 4-P] 
On the very day Maas signed that agreement, February 
25, 1975, Kenneth Allred informed the Bank of the agreement and 
of his obligation to return the truck to Maas at the F-B lot. 
[Tr. 95] Without notice to Maas, Kotter met Kenneth Allred at 
the place where Maas was to receive the truck, and Kotter re-
quested Allred to drive away the 1972 Mack before Maas could 
resume possession. [Tr 96] Kotter accompanied Kenneth Allred 
as he drove the truck to Bountiful. [Tr. 96, 126] 
When Maas arrived at the designated exchange point, he 
discovered that the tractor had been taken away. Maas contacted 
Kotter who told him that the Bank would keep the 1972 Mack until 
the delinquency was cured. [Tr 46-49, 98] Maas informed Kotter 
that he would return to his home in California and get the money 
for the past-due installments. [Tr 49, 51-52, 98] Maas returned 
to the Bank with the money on February 28, 1975, but Kotter 
refused to take the payments, and told him that the vehicle had 
been sold. [Tr 49, 98] 
On or about February 28, 1975, the Bank had received a 
check from Arvel Allred, the father of Kenneth Allred, for the 
-5-
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payoff amount owing on the unpaid balance. [Tr 98-100, 127, 19 ~, 
Maas never received notice of any private sale. [Tr 50] No 
public sale was held. [Tr 10 0] The bank re leased its lien on 
the 1972 Mack. [Tr 119] Subsequently Kenneth Allred transferre:J 
his interest in the tractor to Arvel Allred. [Tr 130] At the 
time of trial the title of the vehicle was still in the name of 
Arvel Allred although he had leased the 1972 Mack back to 
Kenneth Allred who had possession of it. [Tr 128] 
The case was submitted to the jury on special inter-
rogatories. The questions pertinent to this appeal were answer:: 
as follows: (R. 320) 
PROPOSITION NO. 6 
The disposition of the 1972 Mack Tractor on February 
27th or 28th by the Utah Bank & Trust Company was a comrnerciall) 
unreasonable disposition of the tractor. 
True x False No preponderance of the 
evidence either way 
PROPOSITION NO. 7 
The Utah Bank and Trust Company by its acts and conduc: 
through its employees and officers, waived payment of the three 
payments due on the promissory note until the end of business 
hours of the bank on February 28, 1975. 
True x False 
-6-
No preponderance of the 
evidence either way 
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PROPOSITION NO. 8 
The Fair Market Value of the Mack Tractor on the 25th 
of February, 1975, was in the sum of $20,500.00. 
PROPOSITION NO. 9 
The defendant, Utah Bank and Trust Company, wrongfully 
converted the 1972 Mack Tractor on February 25, 1975. 
True False x No preponderance of the 
evidence either way 
In effect, the jury found that although the 1972 Mack 
had a fair market value of $20,500.00, the Bank disregarded 
Maas' interests and disposed of the unit in a commercially 
unreasonably manner for the $4,346.38 pay-off sum. The jury 
also found that the Bank waived payment of the past-due payments 
until the end of the February 28 business day. The actions of 
the bank caused Maas, who was not in default under the lease-
purchase agreement, as amended, to lose his equity in the 1972 
Mack and his right to purchase it. 
Based upon the jury's answers to the special inter-
rogatories and upon the evidence produced at trial, the trial 
judge entered judgment in favor of Maas in the sum of $14,839.31, 
plus interest which amount represented his equity in the 1972 
Mack. [R 385-386) The Bank's Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment 
and Motion for New Trial were denied. 
followed. 
-7-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
I. BY HABITUALLY ACCEPTING LATE PAYMENTS; BY LEADING 
MAAS TO BELIEVE HE HAD TIME TO CURE THE DEFAULT; AND BY FAILING 
TO GIVE HIM A SPECIFIC DEADLINE TO MAKE THE PAYMENTS AND/OR BY 
FAILING TO INFORM HIM OF THE BANK'S CHANGED POSITION; THE 
APPELLANT BANK CONVERTED THE 1972 MACK: 
A. BY THE REPOSSESSION OF FEBRUARY 25, 1975; 
and/or 
B. BY DELIVERING THE TRUCK TO KENNETH ALLRED 
AFTER HAVING RECEIVED THE PAYOFF FROM ARVEL 
ALLRED. 
A. The Appellant Bank Converted The 1972 Mack When I: 
Repossessed That Vehicle On February 25, 1972. 
This court has generally described the tort of conver· 
sion as follows: 
A conversion is an act of willful interference 
with a chattel, done without lawful justifica-
tion by which the person entitled thereto is 
deprived of its use and possession. The measure 
of damages of conversion is the full value of 
the property. It requires such a serious inter-
ference with the owner's right that the pers?n 
interfering therewith may reasonably be required 
to buy the goods. Although conversion results 
only from intentional conduct it does not how-
ever require a conscious wrongdoing, but only 
an intent to exercise dominion or control over 
the goods inconsistent with the owner's right. 
. Allred v. Hinckley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 76, 
328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958). 
A converter is liable to a person ~ 
possession of the chattel as well as to the person in actual 
possession. Restatement of Torts 2d §§ 224A and 225 (196S) · 
-8- d 
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Respondent contends the evidence compels the con-
clusion that on February 25, 1975 he was entitled to inunediate 
possession of the 1972 Mack as to both Kenneth Allred and the 
Bank. On that date Maas signed the amendment to the lease 
purchase agreement between himself and Kenneth Allred. By 
virtue of the express language of the amendment, Kenneth Allred 
had a conditional right to repossess only if Maas failed to make 
future payments to the Bank after the first day of any future 
month. [Tr 84-85] Even if Maas failed to make the February 
payment, Kenneth Allred could not have legally repossessed until 
after March 1, 19 7 5. 
Maas also had rights to inunediate possession insofar 
as the Bank was concerned. Although there were unpaid install-
ment payments which Maas needed to make, he was in contact with 
the Bank. On or about February 18 or 19 he talked with Kotter. 
The transcript reflects the following.testimony by Mr. Maas: 
"Question: What did you say in this conversation? 
Answer: We went in and talked to Mr. Kotter, 
asked him if we could get the payments for the truck 
and could we get the truck back. 
Question: And what did he say. 
Answer: He said yes. 
Question: What did Mr. Kotter say about whether 
or not the bank would accept late payments? 
Answer: He did not say they would not accept 
late payments. 
-9-
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Question: What deadline if any did he give you 
to make those payments? 
Answer: He didn't give me any deadline. 
[Tr 42-43]" (emphasis added) 
Based upon this and other conversations in which the 
Bank said the matter would have to be resolved by the end of 
February, Maas assumed he had at least until February 28, 1975 
to make the payments. And the jury specifically found as a fac: 
that the Bank waived payment until the end of the business day 
of February 28, 1975. [R. 320] 
Of critical significance is the fact that the Bank hac 
dealt with Maas for more than two years. It knew he was making 
payments on the 1972 Mack [Tr 87] and that Maas had the truck 1 
(Id.) It knew on February 25, 1975 that Allred had an agreement 
with Maas to return the truck and where the truck was going to 
be delivered [Tr 95]. Even more importantly, the Bank had 
habitually accepted late payments from Maas. All twenty-six of 
the payments were past due when received, but the Bank accepted 
each one of them. [Tr 92] 
The following testimony by Kotter clearly establishes 
a pattern of dealings which had been well established by Februar 
1975: 
"Question: You knew that the Bank had habituali: 
accepted late payments from Mr. Maas didn't you and 
never repossessed before? 
Answer: Yes. 
-10-
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Question: You knew that Maas had made a number 
of payments? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: You knew the account was paid down 
from about $2,300.00 (sic) to $4,350.00 since the date 
of the lease transaction. 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: And yet you never made a specific 
demand on Mr. Maas for payment by a specific deadline 
date? 
Answer: No. [Tr 97-98]" (emphasis added) 
From the testimony of Mr. Kotter it also appears that 
when the Bank learned that Kenneth Allred was bringing.the truck 
to F-B Truck Lines, Mr. Kotter had a conversation with Mr. 
Atwood,_ the Bank's executive vice-president. [Tr 103] In this 
conversation it was determined that the Bank would repossess the 
1972 Mack when Kenneth Allred drove it into the F-B yard. 
Although Allred was informed of the conversation with Mr. Atwood 
and the change in the Bank's position by deciding to repossess, 
Maas was not. [Tr 104] 
This lengthy fact recitation has been included to show 
that the appellant Bank led Mr. Maas to reasonably believe he 
had until the end of the business day, February 28, 1975, to 
make the payments. On February 28, 1975, Maas, by Mr. Kotter's 
own admission, appeared at the Bank and offered to make the past 
due payments. [Tr 98] Mr. Kotter had previously agreed to hold 
-11-
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the truck until the payments were made. (Id.) Yet when Maas 
came in to make the payments, Mr. Kotter refused to 
accept them 
since the Bank had, without notice to Maas, accepted the pay-off j 
from Arvel Allred. I 
I Numerous decisions of this Court emphasize that where I 
I 
one party establishes a course of dealings with a payor wherein 
strict compliance is not followed, if thereafter the party 
wishes to insist upon rigid compliance, he must reasonably 
inform the payor and give him time to comply. In Williamson 
v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976), this Court held in an 
installment note case that where the defendant payors were give:. 
insufficient notice that plaintiffs would insist on strict / 
performance, a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs would be 
reversed. In that case, it was noted that the plaintiffs had 
accepted late payments in the past. 
In the course of the opinion the Court wrote: 
The clause which allows for acceleration in case 
of default, if strictly enforced, is a severe 
covenant, the invocation of which has similarity 
to other forfeitures. The imposition of such 
severe conditions is not favored in the law; 
and one who seeks to impose them must not, either 
by acts or omission permit another to assume that 
the covenant will not be strictly enforced, th~ 
"crack down" on the obligor by rigidly ins is ti~ 
on enforcement, without giving some reasonable 
notice and opportunity to comply. This i~ a 
doctrine of equity which is firmly establ1sh7d 
in our law by numerous decisions. A foundational 
case is Christy v. Guild to the effect that ~ 
one has accepted overdue payments so that t~-f 
payor has reasonably relied on such course ~ 
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conduct and been led to believe that the payee 
will tolerate a failure of strict performance, 
the latter cannot abruptly change course and insist 
upon strict adherence to the covenant imposed and 
enforce a harsh forfeiture. Id. at 1147-1148. 
(emphasis supplied}. 
In the earlier decision of Calhoun v. Universal 
Credit Co., 106 Utah 166, 146 P.2d 284 (1944), plaintiff entered 
into a contract with the defendant for the purchase of a car. 
All of the installment payments were late in some degree. 
Without giving plaintiff clear prior notice, the defendant 
repossessed. Plaintiff contended that conduct of the defendant 
constituted a waiver of strict performance. This Court agreed, 
noting and citing with approval other decisions: 
' ... Having given appellee an extension of 
time for the payment of the amount due it 
thereby waived all right to forfeit the con-
tract until the time of the extension had 
expired. It could not on the next day and 
before the time had expired, assume an incon-
sistent position ... ' [citing Commercial 
Credit Co. v. Macht, 89 Ind. App. 49, 165 
N.E. 766] 
Thus until notice of intention to enforce the 
forfeiture provisions of the contract was given, 
and a reasonable time to comply with the demand 
for payment allowed, an indefinite extension of 
time would not expire, and defendants could not 
repossess the automobile. Calhoun, supra at 174, 
146 P.2d at 287. 
See also Columbia Airways, Inc. v. Stevens, 80 Utah 
215, 14 P.2d 984 (1932); Munson v. Apartment & Hotel Inv. Co., 
62 Utah 13, 218 P. 109 (Utah 1923). And see Price v. Ford Motor 
Credit Co., 530 s.W.2d 249 (Mo. App. 1975); Sales v. Liberty 
~ual Fire Insurance Co., 273 So. 96 (Fla. App. 1973). 
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Of course there was no written contract betwGen Maas 
and the Bank. But, during their more than two-year dealings 
with each other, a rather definite course of conduct had been 
established. The Bank had accepted late payments. It did not 
attempt to repossess. Statements of its agents or employees 
reasonably led Maas to assume he had until after February 25 tc 
make the past due payments. The conduct of the Bank and Maas 
created an implied agreement between them. Maas knew the Bank 
looked to him for, and accepted payments on the vehicle. The 
Bank knew Maas was using the truck in his business. Each was 
aware of specific interests of the other and a standard of 
business dealings was created and followed. If the Bank intende:! 
to disturb or alter that course, it was obligated to give plait:· 
tiff notice and an opportunity to comply with the altered course 
of business dealings. It did neither. 
And, even if there were no agreement or standard 
created by past conduct, at a minimum, the Bank knew that Maas 
had an interest in the 1972 Mack. [Tr 87] Maas discussed with 
Bank personnel the fact that he was buying the truck from 
Kenneth Allred. [Tr 10] All of these either demonstrated or 
should have demonstrated to the Bank that Maas had legitimate, 
viable interests in the 1972 Mack. Normally, the term lease 
. . 1 dlord after implies a term and a revision to the lessor or an 
its termination. Co
rnrnis s ion, Consolidated Uranium Mines v. Tax ~
-14-
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4 Utah 2d 236, 291 P.2d 895, 897 (1955). However, during the 
term of the lease the lessee has a vested interest in, Harding 
v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 172 Kan. 724, 243 P.2d 199, 203 
(1952), and exclusive possession of the leased property. Lichty 
v. Model Homes, 211 P.2d 958, 966 (Wyo. 1949). 
Plaintiff does not admit he merely had a lease interest 
in the 1972 Mack. But, even if that were all he had, the normal 
rights inherent in a lease arrangement coupled with the repre-
sentations and course of conduct of the Bank required that the 
Bank give some notice of its intention to take and opportunity 
to pay the past due installments before it repossessed. - And, 
the fact that the payments to the Bank were to be credited 
against plaintiff's eventual purchase of the 1972 Mack from 
Allred heightened the need for the Bank to consider Maas' 
interests. 
Respondent respectfully urges that the cited facts 
show as a matter of law that the defendant Bank converted the 
1972 Mack on February 25, 1975 and that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
B. By Delivering The 1972 Mack To Kenneth Allred After 
Accepting The Payoff From Arvel Allred, The Bank Converted The 
Vehicle Afresh. 
Although the trial jury found in Proposition No. 7 
that the Bank had waived payment by Maas of the three past due 
-15-
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payments until the end of the Bank's business hours on Februar 
28, 1975, the jury also answered as "False" Proposition No. 9 
which read: 
"The defendant, Utah Bank and Trust Company, 
wrongfully converted the 1972 Mack Tractor on 
February 25, 1975." (emphasis added) 
Respondent urges the facts require a conclusion thai 
the Bank did convert the vehicle on that date. It is possible 
the jury became confused about the term "wrongfully" and assUJ::: 
that the word involved a violation of criminal law, (and, of 
course, respondent concedes this is not a criminal case). 
hold the truck until the past due payments (not the payoff) wer: 
made. [Tr. 98]. Maas thereafter agreed to come up with those 
payments and actually tendered them to Kotter on the 28th. The 
jury might have found either: 1) that Maas conditionally 
acquiesced in the February 25 repossession provided the Bank 
delivered the truck to him if he made the payments by the 28th, 
or; 2) that the Bank agreed to give Maas until the 28th to make 
the payments after repossession, but converted the vehicle by 
delivering it to Kenneth Allred before the time expired for Maa: 
to bring the account current. 
That a special verdict should be reconciled if pos-
. of 
sible is so widely accepted as to need no extended citation 
-16-
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authorities. C.f. Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah, 141, 146, 247 P.2d 
273, 275 (1952) where this Court wrote: 
" ... Wherever there is uncertainty or doubt 
in connection with the correlation of inter-
rogatories with each other and their answers, 
they should be so interpreted as to harmonize 
with the findings of the jury if that can 
reasonably be done." 
In this case the jury determined the fair market value 
of the truck; it found that there had been waiver by the Bank 
until after the close of the banking day of February 28, 1975. 
If the jury felt there were no "wrongful" conversions on February 
25, there still could have been a conversion after that date, 
but before March 1. Evidence introduced at trial could have 
been found by the jury as facts of a past February 25 conversion 
by the Bank. The verdict is not inherently inconsistent and 
should be upheld. 
POINT II 
II. EVEN IF THE REPOSSESSION BY THE BANK OF THE 1972 
MACK ON FEBRUARY 25 WAS NOT A WRONGFUL CONVERSION, IT NONETHE-
LESS DISPOSED OF THE UNIT IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
UTAH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. 
A. The Acceptance Of The Payoff Sum From A 
~ranger, Arvel Allred, Was Not A Commercially Reasonable Dispo-
~tion As Required By Section 70A-9-504 Of The Utah Code Annotated, 
~ As Amended. 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Regardless of any possible inconsistency of the jury 
interrogatories on the conversion issue, the unambiguous findir 
in proposition No. 6 was that the Bank had disposed of the 19)1 i 
Mack in a commercially unreasonable manner. (R. 320) From th; I 
evidence it appeared that while Maas was attempting to obtain 
the past due payments and in the absence of the Bank giving Ma:,] 
I 
a deadline in which to make the payments, the Bank accepted the 
payoff sum from a single inquirer, who was a stranger to prior 
transactions [Tr 99]. No private sale was held [Tr 100]. Md 
Mr. Maas never received prior notice to bid in, be present at O! 
object to the disposition of the 1972 Mack. [Tr50] . He was noti 
in default under the lease purchase agreement, as amended, but I 
the Bank's disposition of the 1972 Mack deprived him of the 
right to use that vehicle, of his equity in it, and of his right 
to purchase it after all monthly payments had been made. The 
payoff acc.epted by the Bank was less than one-quarter of what 
the jury determined the value of the 1972 Mack was. 
Section 70A-9-504 of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
provides that after default a secured creditor may dispose of 
the collateral, but requires that "every aspect of the disposi-
tion including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be 
commercially reasonable." 70A-9-504(3) Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
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In its recent decision, Chrysler Credit Corporation v. 
Burns, 562 P.2d 223 (Utah 1977), this Court appears to have held 
that a sale is commercially unreasonable if no notice of the 
time, date, place and manner of sale is given to the debtor by 
the secured party. Burns, ~at 234. 
Decisions in other jurisdictions have imposed rather 
stringent requirements on a secured creditor holding a sale or 
disposition. The creditor must exercise due diligence in at-
tempting to get the best price obtainable for the collateral. 
Luxurest Furniture Manufacturing Co. v. Furniture Warehouse Sales, 
Inc., 15 UCC Reporting Service 546 (Ga. 1974). At least one 
court has held that a sale of a car at wholesale for less than 
50 percent of its wholesale bluebook value was commercially 
unreasonable as a matter of law. Credit Bureau Metro, Inc. v. 
~. 45 Cal. App. 2d 12, 119 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1975). And a 
minimally advertised sale of collateral at a low price to a 
single bidder who had no knowledge of local market values has 
also been held to be commercially unreasonable. Mercantile 
Finance Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797 (D.C. Pa. 1969). 
B. Respondent Was Not Given Notice Of The 
Disposition In Time To Protect His Interests And Equity In 
The 1972 Mack. 
Section 70A-9-504(3) of the Utah Uniform commercial 
Code provides as follows: 
-19-
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Disposition of the collateral may be by public 
or private proceedings and may be made by way 
of one or more contracts. Sale or other dis-
position may be as a unit or in parcels at any 
time and place and on any terms but every aspect 
of the disposition including the method, manner 
time, place and terms must be commercially rea-' 
sonable. Unless collateral is perishable or 
threatens to decline speedily in value or is of 
a type customarily sold on a recognized market, 
reasonable notification of the time after which 
any private sale or other intended disposition 
is to be made shall be sent by the secured party 
to the debtor, and except in the case of consumer 
goods to any other person who has a security 
interest in the collateral and who has duly filed 
a financing statement indexed in the name of the 
debtor in this state or who is known by the secured 
party to have a security interest in the collateral. 
(emphasis added) . 
Section 70A-9-105 (d) defines "debtor" rather broadly: I 
"Debtor" means the person who owes payment or 
other performance of the obligation secured, 
whether or not he owns or has rights in the 
collateral, and includes the seller of accounts, 
contract rights or chattel paper. Where the 
debtor and the owner of the collateral are not 
the same person, the term "debtor" means the 
owner of the collateral in any provision of 
the chapter dealing with the collateral, the 
obliger in any provision dealing with the 
obligation, and may include both where the 
contest so requires ... 
Decisions in other jurisdictions interpreting these 
sections of the Uniform Commercial Code have included as "debto: 
one other than a party signing the security agreement who is 
entitled to notice of a disposition of secured property. In 
11 UCC Reporting Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 
) · d that the plaintiff finance compar Service 417 (1972 it appeare ~ ~ 
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had had prior dealings with the defendant. Defendant repre-
sented to plaintiff he was a silent partner in his son-in-law's 
business, but defendant did not sign the security agreement. 
The plaintiff did not rely on the defendant and made a secured 
loan to the son-in-law. When default occurred, the plaintiff 
repossessed the security but did not give notice to the defen-
dant. Defendant successfully argued that the failure to give 
him notice, even though he did not sign the contract, precluded 
the plaintiff from obtaining a deficiency judgment against him. 
See also Hepworth v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 18 UCC Reporting 
Service 542 (Fla. App. 1975) (guarantors of a note held to be a 
"debtor" entitled to notice under the Code). In Franklin National 
Bank v. Katzel, 4 UCC Reporting Service 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967) 
a lessee of an airplane who did not have an option to purchase 
at the end of the lease was held not entitled to UCC protection. 
However, the opinion strongly suggests that had the defendant 
had an option to purchase, he might have been protected. The 
pertinent language is as follows: 
The lease does not afford defendant an option to 
acquire the plane at the expiration of the lease, 
therefore, the provisions of the Uniform commer-
cial Code respecting a buyer's rights upon a 
retaking are not applicable. (emphasis added). 
It should be noted that a number of authorities have 
indicated that where a lease of equipment with an option to 
purchase is such that where the lessee's only sensible course is 
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to exercise the option, the lease is in economic reality a 
security agreement. In re Washington Processin~ Co., Inc., 3 I 
UCC Reporting Service 4 7 5 ( 19 6 6) one rented a piece of equipme: / 
for 36 months for almost $14, 000. 00. The lease gave him an 
option to purchase the equipment at the end of the term for 
than $1, 500. 00. The court held that under the UCC where the 
price of the option to purchase was only about 10 percent oft:., 
total rental and substantially less than the market value oft:.' 
equipment, and debtor's only sensible course was to exercise tr.; 
option, and the lease was in economic reality a conditional 
sales contract. 
i 
The similarities of the case before this court and t~'i 
Washington Process case are evident. Maas' only sensible course 
had he been permitted to maintain the lease was to have exercis0 
the option. He had intended to do so. He told the Bank he 
eventually wanted title to the 1972 Mack. For reasons set fort 
earlier, plaintiff was either a "debtor" or a holder of a secur· 
ity interest within the meaning of 9-504 ( 3) and 9-105 (d) and wa: 
entitled to notice he never received. 
For failing to conduct a commercially reasonable sale, 
for failure to give notice and for failure to meet the good 
faith obligation of section 70A-l-203 of the Code, the defendar.: 
Bank is liable to plaintiff for the loss of his equity in t~ 
1972 Mack and for damages attendant thereto. Section 70A-9-so: 
provides as follows: 
-22-
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Secured party's liability for failure to comply 
with this part.--(1) If it is established that 
the secured party is not proceeding in accor-
dance with the provisions of this part disposi-
tion may be ordered or restrained on appropriate 
terms and conditions. If the disposition has 
occurred the debtor or any person entitled to 
notification or whose security interest has been 
made known to the secured party prior to the 
disposition has a right to recover from the 
secured party any loss caused by a failure to 
comply with the provisions of this part. If the 
collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a 
right to recover in any event an amount not less 
than the credit service charge plus ten percent 
of the principal amount of the debt or the time 
price differential plus ten percent of the cash 
price. (emphasis supplied). 
In the decision of this court in Chrysler Credit 
Corporation v. Burns, supra, it was held that the debtor was 
entitled to damages against the secured party for a commercially 
unreasonable sale pursuant to Section 70A-9-507 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
Regardless of whether the actions of the Bank constituted 
a "sale" in the narrow meaning of the word, its delivery of the 
truck to Kenneth Allred after accepting the payoff from Arvel 
was a "disposition" within the meaning of Section 70A-9-504 (3) 
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. For its improper disposi-
tion of that vehicle, the Bank should be liable to Mr. Maas and 
the jury findings and the lower court verdict can rest indepen-
dently on that basis. 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence is clear that the Bank repossessed the 
1972 Mack, after it had habitually accepted late payments from: 
Maas, and without telling him that the Bank in the future wM: I 
I 
require strict performance of the payment schedule. Indeed the I 
Bank's actions were contrary to its representations to Maas 
he had until the end of February to make the payments. The jur' 
so determined when it answered the special verdict finding that 
the Bank waived payment of the delinquency until the end of 
business hours on February 28, 1975. These facts create a 
conversion of the 1972 Mack by the Bank as a matter of law. 
Further, the Bank's action of disposing of the 1972 
Mack to Arvel Allred for approximately one-quarter of its value 
and without holding a public sale or giving Maas notice of a j 
private sale was a commercially unreasonable disposition under 
the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. Again the jury determined 
this to be the case when, after instruction on the law, it 
found that the disposition of the 1972 Mack Tractor on February 
27 or 28 by the Bank was commercially unreasonable. 
Under either or both of the above jury findings, the 
Judgment awarding Maas his equity in the 1972 Mack should be 
affirmed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of June, 1977. 
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RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
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